3.2 Given a scenario, apply security principles to secure enterprise infrastructure
Domain 3: Security Architecture
This scenario objective is about placing and choosing infrastructure controls. Know device placement and security zones, attack surface, connectivity, and failure modes (fail-open versus fail-closed). Compare device attributes: active versus passive, inline versus tap or monitor. Cover network appliances — jump servers, proxy servers, IPS versus IDS, load balancers, sensors — plus port security (802.1X, EAP), firewall types (WAF, UTM, NGFW, layer 4 versus layer 7), and secure communications: VPN, remote access, tunneling with TLS or IPSec, SD-WAN, and SASE. Selection of effective controls ties it together. The exam wants placement logic: an IPS must sit inline to block; an IDS on a tap only alerts; a jump server brokers admin access into a secure zone; a WAF protects web applications at layer 7. Expect a fail-open versus fail-closed question framed around whether availability or security matters more for the described system.
What you must know
- IPS vs IDS placement
- Fail-open vs fail-closed
- Jump servers
- 802.1X port security
- WAF vs NGFW
- IPSec and TLS tunneling
common pitfall · Candidates choose an IDS when the scenario requires blocking traffic, forgetting that only an inline IPS can prevent rather than just detect.
Try sample questions
A hospital is adding network-connected infusion pumps that cannot run endpoint security agents. The security architect must limit the impact of a compromised pump while keeping every device reachable by the clinical management server. Which two design choices best meet this goal? (Select TWO.)
- A Assign the pumps to the same VLAN as staff workstations to simplify traffic monitoring
- B Place the pumps in a dedicated segment with firewall rules allowing traffic only to the management server
- C Install host-based intrusion prevention software on each infusion pump
- D Require 802.1X with device certificates so only authorized pumps can join the segment
- E Publish the pump management interface to the internet so the vendor can patch it remotely
Show answer & explanations
- A Mixing unmanaged medical devices with staff workstations lets a compromised pump reach user endpoints directly, which is exactly the lateral movement the architect is trying to prevent.
- B correct ·Correct. A dedicated segment with firewall rules limited to the management server contains a compromised pump, preventing it from reaching other clinical systems or the general hospital network.
- C The scenario states the pumps cannot run endpoint security agents, so host-based intrusion prevention software cannot be installed on them regardless of its potential benefit.
- D correct ·Correct. Certificate-based 802.1X authentication ensures a rogue or spoofed device cannot simply plug into the pump segment, enforcing that only authorized pumps ever join that network.
- E Publishing the management interface to the internet exposes life-critical devices to worldwide attackers; vendor patching should occur through controlled channels such as a monitored VPN instead.
sample item — the full bank runs 450+ questions at exam difficulty
Administrators at a logistics company currently open RDP sessions directly from their everyday office workstations to servers in a screened subnet. A recent assessment flagged this practice as a serious weakness. Which change best applies secure infrastructure design principles to administrative access?
- A Deploy a hardened jump server in a management zone as the only permitted source for administrative sessions
- B Require administrators to use significantly longer passwords for their existing direct RDP connections
- C Move the servers into the same VLAN as the workstations to simplify the firewall rule set
- D Open the servers' RDP ports on the perimeter firewall and restrict connections with geo-IP filtering
Show answer & explanations
- A correct ·Correct. A hardened jump server concentrates administrative access through a single monitored, tightly controlled host, letting firewall rules block direct sessions from general-purpose workstations that may be compromised.
- B Longer passwords slightly strengthen authentication but leave the underlying design flaw intact: everyday workstations exposed to email and web browsing can still reach the servers directly.
- C Flattening the network by merging VLANs removes segmentation entirely, expanding the attack surface instead of restricting the paths an attacker could take to reach the servers.
- D Exposing RDP through the perimeter firewall increases risk dramatically; geo-IP filtering is easily bypassed with proxies and does nothing to authenticate or isolate administrative sessions.
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